Historically, data from brain imaging and brain stimulation studies have supported the idea that the processing of observed actions recruits -among other areas -a distinct sub-set of brain sites in the sensory and motor cortices. These empirical findings have initially been linked with the thesis of direct matching as a mechanism of action understanding, i.e., the idea of motor resonance implemented by mirror neurons. In more recent approaches, it has been proposed that the mirror neuron system plays a role in minimizing prediction error when inferring the most likely cause of an observed action. According to these theories, motor resonance is thought to function as predictive coding. Other theoretical accounts suggest that action understanding might result from a hypothesis testing mechanism in which potential goals are continually fed into the system until the correct one is identified. In this review, we will explore the relationship of these theories to specific empirical findings. Finally, we will discuss the implications of these theoretical structures on action observation-based approaches to the optimization of skilled performance in athletes and patients.
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Thinking is more interesting than knowing, but less interesting than looking. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
Introduction
Humans observe other humans quite extensively in everyday life. Action observation informs us about the roles of other people in our environment and allows us to make predictions which will guide our own behavioral output. A key problem in cognitive neuroscience for quite some time has been how to conceptualize the processing of observed actions (POA) for action understanding and how to conceptualize the way in which activation of motor sites in the observer's system impacts their future actions.
In the following sections, we will first elaborate on the role of POA in action understanding and the proposed function of the mirror neuron system (MNS) in action simulation. We will then discuss a wide range of empirical findings which are relevant to POA. In the final section, action observation-based approaches to optimizing skilled performance in athletes and patients will be discussed in light of current theories of POA.
Processing of observed actions, the mirror neuron system, and simulation
In which contexts do we observe other human beings acting? Which goals or intentions might our observational systems be tuned to detect? A number of possibilities spring to mind. In some situations POA could serve a purely perceptual-predictive function. When you wait for a blind date, for example, you might observe the gait patterns or eye movements of approaching individuals with the goal of singling out your partner. When you watch your favorite basketball team, you will pay close attention to the shots of the players in order to better anticipate their successes or failures. In such situations there exist behavioral acts which can be prepared and executed in response to the predictions generated by the system, but often, in such situations the response is delayed in time relative to the observed action. Second, humans can observe other humans with the express goal of motorically reenacting a specific kinematic pattern and/or generating a certain set of effects in the environment. This type of imitation-like behavior is often observed early in childhood when infants begin to learn from their primary caregivers (e.g., how to brush teeth or how to switch on the light; Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000) , and may extend, despite adages about old dogs and new tricks, throughout one's lifetime. Third, we may observe others with the goal of computing and executing motor responses that 0042-6989/$ -see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2011.01.007 will increase the fluency and effectiveness of cooperative interactions (e.g., moving heavy objects as a group, playing sports or carrying on a conversation).
Certainly, this is not an exhaustive list of all the goals one might have during action observation. It should also be noted that POA might happen without pursuing a goal. However, from a representational viewpoint, the observer's goal influences the POA. To date, numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that an observer's motor system tends to be activated in all of the aforementioned contexts. It is important to consider that the motor system is not only activated during POA with a direct or subsequent motor response, but also when predominantly perceptual-predictive functions need to be achieved. A popular approach makes reference to mirror neurons (MN), named for the fact that they fire during action execution as well as during observation of roughly the same action (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004 for review) . This finding of action mirroring has triggered intense discussion and speculation about the existence of a MNS in humans as well as the possible functions that such a network might subserve (Csibra, 2007; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Hickok, 2008; Iacoboni, 2009a) . Neuroscientists and philosophers of mind have suggested that the role of action mirroring is essential in many social contexts (emulation, sensing empathy, and inter-subjectivity, etc.). The unifying feature here is to infer the goal of observed actions (Rizzolatti, ). According to these authors, action understanding is achieved by a mechanism called direct matching, in which an internal replica of the observed action is generated allowing the observer to simulate the goals or outcomes of the respective action. Kilner, Friston, and Frith (2007) expand this approach and suggest ''predictive coding'' as a mechanism whereby intentions can be inferred from observed actions.
As an alternative to resonance based direct-matching, action mirroring can also be viewed as action reconstruction (Csibra, 2007) . Referring to action hierarchies (Jeannerod, 1994) , the model by Csibra proposes that the means to achieve goals do not have to match the observed actions on a kinematic level. Essentially, it is suggested that action understanding does not necessarily result from resonance, but that a set of goal hypotheses are fed into the observer's motor system as a starting point.
Numerous authors have proposed that the MNS allows for imitation behavior (Iacoboni, 2009b) . But although macaques obviously have MNs imitation behavior cannot readily be observed in this species (Hauser & Wood, 2010; Wohlschläger & Bekkering, 2002) . Humans, on the other hand, do engage in imitative behavior in a highly flexible manner. The extent to which the monkey MNS and the human MNS share equal functionality is a matter of debate. In humans, the existence of an MNS has predominantly been inferred from imaging studies reporting increased activity in brain regions presumed to be homologous to the MN regions in monkeys. Using single-and multiunit recordings in epilepsy patients during action observation, Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, and Fried (2010) provided evidence for the existence of neurons in the human brain which possess response properties similar to those of monkey MNS. Interestingly, these neurons were also found outside the expected MN areas in monkeys (e.g., in the temporal cortices and supplementary motor areas). Does this suggest that the occurrence of MNS is much more common in the human brain than in monkeys? One could also ask whether this is the reason why the so-called 'action observation network' (AON; see ) reaches beyond the assumed human homologues of the monkey MNS. In a recent meta-analysis of 104 human action observation studies, Caspers, Zilles, Laird, and Eickhoff (2010) documented that not only parts of the SMA, the dorsal premotor cortex (dPMC), and the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44/45), but also the primary somatosensory cortex, the superior parietal lobe, the posterior middle temporal gyrus, and the fusiform face/body area were consistently activated in both hemispheres. These areas extend well beyond the borders of the proposed core MNS (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) .
Theoretical approaches to action understanding
To date, explanations of the effect of POA on motor output have been based primarily on a mechanism known as direct matching. According to direct-matching theory, POA activates internal representations of the observed movements which ''resonate'' with the observers' own motor system. The direct-matching theory suggests that a visual representation triggers a high-level goal representation via bottom-up propagation from the motor system (i.e., ''an action is understood when its observation causes the motor system of the observer to 'resonate' [with the observed action]''; Rizzolatti et al., 2001, p. 661) . Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2010) propose a neuronal mechanism of understanding, ''chains'' of neurons in the IPL, in which single neurons code single motor acts while chains of neurons code for specific actions. Activation of a neuron in this chain is propagated to the other members in the chain and via connections of the chains, the intention is recognized.
Low-level mirroring assumes a close relationship between the observed action and the simulated one. The MNS may constitute the biological substrate of such a mechanism. Action resonance results in action understanding because the observer recovers the intention that generated the observed action via his or her own internal action simulation . In this sense, the original direct-matching approach is retrodictive, i.e., it tries to infer the underlying goal of the actor on the basis of the specifically observed action. Goal understanding, in this view, is ''generated'' by bottom-up propagation, resulting in activation within the motor system. The idea is that visual information about the observed actions activates neurons in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and is then passed forward to parietal mirror neurons and from there to the frontal mirror neurons in the premotor cortex. This forward processing parallels the steps from low-level representation (e.g., movement kinematics) to high-level representation (e.g., intentions), with the premotor cortex being a substrate for those high-level representations.
Newer theories (Kilner et al., 2007; Knoblich, 2008) question the MNS as a feedforward recognition model. They suggest that the MNS plays a key role in inference of intentions via so-called predictive coding, involving different descriptive levels of actions (i.e., kinematics, goals, intentions, context; see also Hamilton & Grafton, 2007) . This means that knowledge of intentions allows the prediction of a goal which corresponds to a specific action; and ''at each level the predicted activity is compared to the actual activity and any difference is projected back up the hierarchy as a prediction error'' (Kilner et al., 2007, p. 164) . Kilneŕs approach is based on Bayesian statistics and proposes that the most likely cause of an action can be inferred by ''minimalizing prediction error through recurrent or reciprocal interactions among levels of a cortical hierarchy'' (Kilner et al., 2007, p. 161) . The theoretical advantage of this approach, compared to the original direct-matching theory is that, based on the situational context, predictive coding can infer different intentions even when movements are identical. In addition, it does not necessarily imply that the activation of premotor cortex corresponds to the highest level of representing actions (see Kilner et al., 2007, for details) .
In a related, but still alternative view, referred to as action reconstruction, motor system activation does not result in action understanding through bottom-up propagation (Csibra, 2007) . Rather, things operate the other way round; a hypothesized goal is initially produced outside the motor system which serves as a template for the construction of a goal-appropriate action. Csibra proposes that the observed action is analyzed ''at some level of description and that the result of this analysis is mapped onto the observeŕs motor system'' (Csibra, 2007, p. 441) . Relevantly, the theory states that, in cases where the observed actions can be attributed to an intention (i.e., an action interpretation is available), they will be passed onto the motor system for reconstruction of a low-level representation, e.g., the kinematics. Here, ''. . . action understanding may precede, rather than follow from, action mirroring'' (Csibra, 2007, p. 443) . In this sense, action reconstruction involves predictive simulation: observers simulate what the other should do to achieve a certain goal and derive the appropriate action hierarchy, i.e., generate the motor code from the hypothesized goal via sub-goals. This simulation might be a motor simulation: when the same motor constraints between actor and observer exist, this seems to be an efficient and fast way to simulate. However, Csibra states, if an action interpretation is not available, low-level mirroring, inducing motor system activation, might nevertheless occur; but without a bottom-up propagation to infer goal understanding. Also, respectively, in case one (implicitly or explicitly) interprets non-biological motion as ''humanly''-produced, this might activate the motor system through top-down propagation. In cases where no high-level representation is available, this approach is still compatible with low-level mirroring. It is, however, important to note that goal representations are not always accompanied by motor activation and, vice versa, motor activation can occur when it is used as an anticipating device outside the motor domain, e.g., for perceptual goals.
The next sections will elaborate on empirical findings in the brain and behavioral sciences which are pertinent to human POA including (i) congruency between observed and simulated actions, (ii) the role of motor expertise, (iii) imitation and instructions, (iv) observing biological vs. non-biological motion, (v) complementary actions, and (vi) observing objects and object-directed actions.
Congruency between observed and simulated actions
What are the circumstances under which low-level kinematic information is represented in action mirroring? The original direct-matching theory suggests a tight linkage between the kinematics of the observed and the executed action. One way to measure this coupling mechanism involves motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) which can be recorded in muscles as an excitatory response to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). MEPs provide us with a measure for the involvement of the motor system in a given task. Numerous empirical data from studies examining MEPs to POA appear to be compatible with the general notion of a tight linkage between kinematics of the observed and executed actions, specifically demonstrating a correspondence on the level of effectors. For example, an increase in MEPs during POA was reported by Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, and Rizzolatti (1995) and the MEP pattern reflected the pattern of muscle activity during action execution. Strafella and Paus (2000) reported facilitation of MEPs specific to the muscle involved in the observed arm movements. During observation of a reaching-grasping action, the MEP was even modulated by finger aperture in an experiment by Gangitano, Mottaghy, and Pascual-Leone (2004) .
An influential fMRI study by Buccino et al. (2001) addressed the effects of observing bodily effectors (mouth, hand, foot) completing actions which were either object-directed or not. In line with low-level mirroring, the authors found a rough somatotopic pattern of activation, with the mouth stimuli activating the most ventral and the foot stimuli the most dorsal section of the PMC. Also behavioral data (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001 ; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003) , showing that observing arm movements impacts arm movement execution, support the idea of a tight congruence between observed and simulated actions.
It has been argued that MN activation also encodes action goals; a feature which has been referred to as 'teleogical sensitivity' of the MNS (Morin & Grèzes, 2008) . In a study by Fogassi et al. (2005) , for example, monkeys observed grasping movements of the experimenter either for eating or for placing and found that the same motor act (i.e., grasping) leads to differential activation depending on the final goal (i.e., eating or placing). The authors concluded that in specific monkey IPL neurons, intentions are encoded in addition to the observed act. But how can direct matching alone then explain action understanding? Are there specific sets of MN that either code for intention or for kinematics? How would these neurons interact? Obviously, the original direct-matching theory is not sufficient to explain action understanding based on a strict congruency between simulated and observed actions because goal representations can be independent of motor acts (imagine grasping a bottle to pour into someone's glass vs. grasping the bottle to throw it). Via predictive coding, however, a differentiation of the action causes between kinematically identical movements can be inferred based on minimizing the prediction error between different levels of the action hierarchy. Viewing action mirroring as action reconstruction explains high-and low-level mirroring: If observed actions can be interpreted at a higher level, this information will be forwarded on to the motor system.
The role of motor expertise
An essential feature of the macaque's MNS is its high degree of sensitivity to actions in their own motor repertoire. Substantial evidence now also exists to support the claim that activity in the human AON is modulated by prior motor experience (Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Pilgramm, Lorey, Stark, Munzert, & Zentgraf, 2010) and sensorimotor learning Heyes, 2010) . In Calvo-Merino et al.'s study (2006), brain activity was measured in expert male and female dancers while they observed male-and female-specific moves. Visual familiarity was equally high for both stimuli, but motor familiarity was specialized for gender-specific moves. Observing moves from their own motor repertoire enhanced activation in left dPMC, the bilateral intraparietal sulcus (IPS), and the cerebellum. Using a more powerful intervention design in which participants were randomly assigned to experimental groups, Cross, de Hamilton, and Grafton (2006) manipulated the amount of physical practice to elucidate the role of motor experience on AON activation with fMRI. Specifically, these authors had expert dancers practice novel dance sequences for 5 h across a period of 5 weeks. One finding was that left IPL and left vPMC enhanced activation as a function of perceived ability to dance the observed sequence compared with observation of dance sequences that the dancers could not dance.
The authors of these studies concluded that activation of relevant motor representations supports motor simulation. The activation differences reported in the study by Calvo-Merino and Cross suggest that a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, difference exists between the brain's response to observed actions falling within and outside of one's own motor repertoire. In this case, predictive simulation may be taken to mean that experts possess very specific knowledge about the unfolding action elements (i.e., they have a high-level representation) which is fed into the motor system to predict the appropriate motor response of the observed dancer. In cases where inverse models are used in combination with forward models (such as in motor experts), the efference copy of the simulated motor response acts as an input to a forward model for further predictions (Kawato, 1999) .
The Eye sees only what the mind is prepared to comprehend. Robertson Davies
Imitation and instructions
In an influential neuroimaging experiment on human imitation Iacoboni et al. (1999) hypothesized that areas endowed with mirror-like matching properties should show pronounced activation when an action (e.g., lifting a finger) was preceded by observation of the same action (as compared to a spatial or symbolic cue). The authors found that observing actions with the goal of subsequent imitation in mind elicited robust BOLD signals in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), specifically in Broca's area (area 44), as well as in the inferior parietal cortex. These data were interpreted in terms of the direct-matching hypothesis; with mirror areas becoming specifically engaged when participants were observing an action with the goal of subsequent imitation. A later study by addressed the question of the involvement of the AON in imitation by examining brain activation during observation of guitar chords which later had to be reproduced. They found strong activations in the IFG, PMC, and parietal cortices. A similar study was conducted by Vogt et al. (2007) . Again, significant brain activity was observed in the AON, including inferior parietal areas and the ventral PMC (vPMC), during the initial stages of learning when participants were observing new, non-practiced actions which were later imitated. Frey and Gerry (2006) demonstrated that activity in the AON is modulated by the intention to imitate. As opposed to previous studies which focused on simple (Iacoboni et al., 1999) or temporally discrete actions (Buccino, Vogt, et al., 2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Vogt et al., 2007) , Frey and Gerry (2006) used a paradigm which examined observation of action sequences. This is interesting because these findings are arguably easier to generalize to a variety of fields in which action sequences rather than isolated actions must be learned through observation and subsequent imitation. Specifically, participants observed the assembly (with or without the intention to later recreate the assembled items) or disassembly of a simple object made of six parts and subsequently imitated the action outside of the scanner. Attempting to learn through observation resulted in increased activation in the AON, and, noteworthy, activation in the right anterior intraparietal sulcus actually predicted performance on subsequent replications of the assembly task.
All these studies seem to suggest that the AON, and specifically the areas endowed with mirror qualities within the AON, are relevant for enabling imitative behavior (Iacoboni, 2005) . However, these studies hardly provide convincing evidence that only direct matching is the mechanism by which humans understand actions. An action reconstruction view claims that a low-level congruency (i.e., effectors and kinematics) does not necessarily mean that actions have been ''understood''. Also, in all the mentioned imitation studies, high-level information could have influenced low-level motor output. Goals could easily have been derived from the experimental context and/or the task instructions (e.g., observe to imitate). To learn more about the role of high-level representations in POA, Zentgraf et al. (2005) focused on the influence of imitative or evaluative instructions on the AON in an fMRI study. Physical-education students viewed identical gymnastic sequences that they were motorically able to reproduce. The experimental conditions were derived from the idea that two essential modes of observing in the field of sports are either to observe for later motor reproduction (as in observational learning) or to observe in order to evaluate and judge human movements, e.g., as a referee or a judge. When contrasting the observation phases of each condition, pronounced activation in the SMA proper was found when participants had to subsequently mentally rehearse the observed sequence in a first-person perspective. In the evaluative mode, the pre-SMA, an area anterior to the SMA proper, shows pronounced activation. We assume that the a priori knowledge of the goal led to differential top-down propagation to the low-level action representation resulting in differential activation of the motor system (i.e., the SMA). Interestingly, in both experimental conditions the vPMC is comparably activated because predicting the course of the action sequence is essential for both tasks (see also Munzert, Zentgraf, Stark, & Vaitl, 2008) .
If anything is sacred, the human body is sacred. Walt Whitman
Observing biological vs. non-biological motion
The direct-matching hypothesis states that action mirroring should vary as a function of the similarity of biological constraints of the actor and the observer (e.g., . Although there are plenty of results that seem to be compatible with this notion, recent studies have revealed important inconsistencies in this general claim (e.g., Costantini et al., 2005) .
Some findings in this respect come from the developmental literature. The human brain reacts differently to biological and nonbiological motion from a very young age (Fox & McDaniel, 1982; Martineau & Cochin, 2003; Reid, Hoehl, Landt, & Striano, 2008) . In one demonstration of this, 12-month-old infants exhibited predictive gaze behavior when an object was moved by a human agent but not when it was self-propelled (Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006) . In addition, studies in adults show differing levels of sensitivity for biological and non-biological stimuli. Results from EEG and TMS studies suggest that motor and motor-related areas play an essential role in the perception of biological movements. In an EEG study, comparing biological and non-biological movements in a low-resolution electromagnetic tomography analysis (LORETA), Holz, Doppelmayr, Klimesch, and Sauseng (2008) found higher involvement during the observation of biological movements in the primary motor cortex, PMC, SMA, and the posterior parietal cortices than during observation of non-biological stimuli. Lepage, Tremblay, and Théoret (2010) used TMS to investigate the time-course of MI corticospinal excitability associated with POA. They found that increased excitability was associated with the observation of biological movement, but not of dot-motion stimuli containing the same motion information within another configuration.
There is also considerable evidence from neuroimaging studies that a specific brain network differentiates human movements from the rest of the environment (Grossman & Blake, 2002; Servos, Osu, Santi, & Kawato, 2002) . A specific focus has been put on the STS and the extrastriate body area (EBA). The EBA is located adjacent to motion-sensitive area V5 and shows pronounced activation to the human body, depicted as silhouettes, photographs, line drawings or stick figures (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001) . In an experiment by Downing, Peelen, Wiggett, and Tew (2006) , the response in EBA was stronger to whole human bodies than for hands, and weakest for control objects and faces. Concerning the role of STS in the processing of biological-motion stimuli, moving eyes, hands, mouth, and bodies consistently activate a posterior region of STS (Bonda, Petrides, Ostry, & Evans, 1996; Grossman et al., 2000; Vaina, Solomon, Chowdhury, Sinha, & Belliveau, 2001 ). Also degraded human stimuli known as point-light figures (Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby, & Martin, 2003; Giese & Poggio, 2003; Grossman & Blake, 2002; Grèzes et al., 2001; Thompson, Clarke, Stewart, & Puce, 2005) activate the STS. The STS appears to ''gate'' information flowing from perceptual to motor areas, perhaps giving special preference to stimuli with biological characteristics (Csibra, 2005) . It is also important to note that Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, Sawamoto, and Castiello (2004) have provided data which support a ''biological tuning'' of the human MNS.
Although the vast amount of research suggests that the motor system responds optimally to biological triggers, it should be acknowledged that other lines of research have seriously challenged this interpretation. In studies by Schubotz's group (e.g., Schubotz, Sakreida, Tittgemeyer, & von Cramon, 2004; Wolfensteller, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2007) , it has been demonstrated that the PMC also subserves prediction of non-biological dynamics, challenging the premature interpretation of vPMC being mostly a mirror area. In Schubotz's studies, the PMC is consistently activated when participants observe non-biological sequences and need to predict their further course, a task comparable to imagining a (biological) motor sequence (Schubotz, 2007) . Schubotz and von Cramon (2003) argue that any dynamic event, be it biological or non-biological, relies on the PMC when prediction is an essential feature. In a similar vein, Engel, Burke, Fiehler, Bien, and Rösler (2008) have proposed that the vPMC does not primarily respond to observation of biologically possible motion in a bottom-up manner, but rather to the intentional goal of the observer. These studies by Schubotz and Engel show that activation in the MN regions does not necessarily directly relate to ''mirroring''. It is not only the biological similarity that drives PMC activation, it's the predictive activity that is just immanent in motor behavior, be it executed or observed. These studies clearly point to the fact that the situational context and the observer's intentions play a key role for the activation of motor sites; possibly more than the nature of the observed stimuli themselves.
I didn't go to acting school, but I've been observing my fellow man for 66 years now, and I would think that's the best school there is.
Wilford Brimley

Complementary actions
Within a given social context, most humans continuously observe relevant social action cues (such as body movements, posture, and facial expressions) in order to better predict the future actions of social peers (Bekkering et al., 2009 ). An only recently emerging branch of social cognitive neuroscience has begun to examine patterns of brain activity resulting from the observation of human social interactions themselves. Imagine, for example, the simple case of building a model airplane together with a partner. During the performance of such 'shared cooperative activities' (Bratman, 1992) , participants are likely to engage in complementary actions, or actions which, when combined with the appropriately matched actions of another person, will help accomplish a given goal or achieve a specific task. Critically, these complementary actions are different from imitative actions, making us question how useful theories of direct matching would be in explaining their selection and execution.
An experiment by Newman-Norlund, van Schie, van Zuijlen, and Bekkering (2007) examined the role of the AON associated with the preparation of complementary actions. Participants prepared to imitate or complement a visually presented gripping action. In the imitation condition, participants were told to imitate the movement of the confederate, whereas, in the complementary condition, participants were told to respond as if taking over the object from the confederate. It was found that, compared to preparation of imitative actions, the preparation of complementary actions resulted in increased BOLD signal in the right IFG, and bilateral inferior parietal lobule (IPL). In a second experiment, participants lifted and balanced a virtual bar either alone or together with a partner. Joint bar lifting, a process already shown to involve the generation of complementary actions in a behavioral paradigm (Bosga & Meulenbroek, 2007) , evoked greater BOLD signal in the right IFG, the IPL, and the STS (Newman-Norlund, Meulenbroek, & Bekkering, 2008) . In this experiment, participants were both (i) continuously observing the distal effects of other people's actions (represented on the screen) and (ii) continuously generating complementary responses to assist their partner. Compared to lifting the bar alone, lifting the bar with a partner elicited activations in the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), an area thought to be involved in the attribution of mental states to others (Saxe & Wexler, 2005) and the precuneus which has been associated with determining the sense of agency (Vogeley et al., 2001) .
Viewing action mirroring as a predictive simulation is in line with experimental findings from studies involving joint action. In cases of joint action, it would actually be maladaptive for one's own motor system to 'resonate' with an observed action (e.g., planning an identical movement). Most humans can inhibit the execution of inappropriate identical actions. Action prediction is essential for the planning of these complementary actions (Csibra, 2007; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006) and based on that, some authors have adopted a more general interpretation of POA on motor output. Here, they make reference to a general ''perception-to-action-procedure'' (allowing, for example, for action coordination; Csibra, 2007, p. 454) which allows for the flexible mapping of observed actions onto action execution. Csibra even proposed that neurons which respond to simulated joint actions should not be named ''mirror neurons'', but rather ''emulator neurons'' (Csibra, 2007, p. 454) to account for their role in enabling non-identical, but goal-conducive responses critical to successful joint actions.
We kings do develop a certain ability to recognize objects under our noses. Robin McKinley
Observing objects and object-directed actions
Over the course of any given day, humans typically interact with a large number of different objects, which possess various motor affordances and functional uses. We interact with other people who use objects in a number of settings including kitchens, restaurants, classrooms, and sports venues. Objects with affordances have intrinsic properties, such as shape, size, orientation, and direction of movement, which define an 'opposition space' and in doing so dictate the sub-set of possible actions that can be carried out by an actor. We typically interact with such objects in a known manner using one or more effectors (mostly the hand), but sometimes we also need to observe someone acting on an object to understand its function (Menz, Blangero, Kunze, & Binkofski, 2010 , for a recent fMRI study on this issue). The predominant members of this category of objects are, of course, tools. To date, a number of studies have examined the brain's response to processing object-directed actions (PODA).
In one of the first fMRI studies to specifically measure the brain's response to objects and motor affordances, Grèzes, Tucker, Armony, Ellis, and Passingham (2003) instructed participants to execute either power or precision grips in response to observation of objects which were typically grasped using power or precision grips. Observation of incongruent trials (i.e., there was a motor affordance mismatch) elicited greater activation in the observer's inferior frontal, premotor, and parietal AON sites. Here, it can be claimed that the observer possesses specific knowledge regarding the goals associated with a specific tool. PODA activates these goal-appropriate actions which are then compared to the observed action. In cases where there is a mismatch, extra processing in the respective brain areas is needed.
Lastly, it is important to note that, while most experiments examining the AON's response to objects have used some mélange of human effectors and objects in their portrayal of PODA, observation of objects themselves (even in the absence of any explicit actions) can and does lead to activation at sites within the AON. A number of experimental data support the idea that observation of objects automatically activates the actions associated with those objects (Gallivan, Cavina-Pratesi, & Culham, 2009; Gerlach, Law, & Paulson, 2002; Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995) . For example, Chao and Martin (2000) showed that simply viewing and naming tools elicited activations in the left vPMC (BA 6) and the left IPL (BA 40), both of which are components of the AON. It remains unclear how direct matching could explain these findings, but it is compatible with predictive simulation approaches.
We are, in truth, more than a half of what we are by imitation. Lord Chesterfield 4. Application of action observation in motor skill learning and motor recovery
In this section, we will focus on the role of action observation in an instructional setting. Here, observational strategies are used by instructors and teachers within the context of a demonstration to teach motor skills in a ''watch it, do it''-manner. We are aware of the fact that processing of observed actions also occurs when tennis spectators observe a match or when referees and judges observe gymnasts or players to score floor-exercise performances and make penalty calls. As the focus here is on the promotion of motor learning or recovery, we will refer to the use of action observation as a demonstration (i.e., it relates to the acquisition of motor skills). Essentially, we will highlight which conceptual framework most aptly applies to the design and implementation of action observation-centered interventions.
The underlying logic when using visual demonstrations is that by observing another person performing a motor skill, relevant information may be conveyed and may guide the learner's motor behavior. As such, observing others performing a motor skill, on the one hand, is often implemented by coaches and teachers to foster subsequent kinematic reproduction (Magill, 2006; e.g., stretch the elbows for a bump set in volleyball). On the other hand, learners watch a demonstration of a motor skill with the foreknowledge that their own motor practice will immediately follow the demonstration by the model and that -depending on the specific motor task -the ultimate goal (e.g., bring the ball to the setter on volleyball or score a basket) must not be neglected.
Different effects of using demonstrations have indeed been shown in different tasks (McCullagh & Little, 1989; McCullagh & Weiss, 2001 ) and, essentially, the effectiveness of demonstrations depends on the nature of the skill being taught (Hodges & Franks, 2004) . Horn and Williams (2004, p. 198) suggested four task types that influence learning: (1) outcome-defined (computer tracking, game tasks), (2) outcome-dominated (penalty in soccer, weightlifting), (3) process-dominated (motor-skills-emphasizing techniques, outcome is visible), (4) process-defined (gymnastics, complex actions without object). Obviously, learning motor skills via demonstrations is sometimes more about achieving the model's outcome (often related to an object) and sometimes more about matching one's movements to those of the model, but mostly it is an interaction of both. Task constraints are plausibly different in tasks without an object-related outcome goal, e.g. in floor exercises or gymnastics. In the latter, an attentional focus is put on the model's movements assures replication of movement form, and therefore, the invariant features of a movement pattern are relevant information within a demonstration. Scully and Newell (1985) proposed that while observing a model, observers directly perceive the relative motion pattern of the model and act on its basis. When relative motion of learner and model are similar ''within certain bandwidths'', modeling has taken place. Magill (2006) states that visual demonstrations are only superior to other teaching approaches (e.g., discovery learning) when the acquisition of a new coordination pattern is needed (Schoenfelder-Zhodi, 1992 ), e.g., in complex whole-body skills. The means to achieve a demonstrated action, i.e., a specific coordination pattern, should therefore be in the focus of an observer. Schoenfelder-Zhodi (1992) hypothesized that in the early stages of observational learning, visual demonstration facilitates acquisition because it conveys low-level information about the relative motion of the limbs, which is necessary for coordination. She measured kinematic variables on a ski simulator and corroborated this assumption by showing that the modeling group approximated the model's movement pattern earlier than a discovery learning group that could not observe a model. The conclusion was that observing demonstrations of a novel motor skill induced a more sophisticated level of coordination within the learner at the beginning of practice.
In many motor tasks, however, the ultimate goal can be achieved in a variety of different ways, and with a variety of different means. So to directly match the observed movements only makes sense in very specific motor tasks, e.g., in synchronized swimming. But in many tasks, achieving the goal is more successful when non-identical means are used. From a conceptual viewpoint, this is exactly what the predictive simulation approaches suggest. Based on high-level representations, different kinematic patterns depending on subject-specific variables and context are simulated in a predictive manner. The specific kinematics used by the model must not necessarily be adopted (Horn, Williams, & Scott, 2002) . This latter finding highlights the point that in outcome-dominated tasks as penalty in soccer or weight-lifting, it is more useful to reproduce higher-level (i.e. strategic) aspects of the to-be-learned actions (e.g., how to approach a ball for kicking) than the limb coordination pattern (low-level) of the observed model.
Indeed, it has been suggested that the inconsistent benefits of using demonstrations to enhance motor skill acquisition might be attributed either to the neglect of task constraints or to the neglect of the learning stage that affects the learners' needs for coordination information. Obviously, an object that has to be acted upon in a specific manner attracts much of the observer's attention; in the field of sports, movement outcomes are related to object features (e.g., miss or hit). This nicely matches up with neuroscientific studies on PODA, suggesting that the presence of objects strongly influences the neural response to a given action.
It is also notable that action observation interventions have recently been proposed in clinical settings to regain motor function. Specifically, a number of authors have argued that POA can facilitate physical training and should, in this way, have a positive impact on recovery following cerebral insult. Based on the findings that POA recruits the motor system and that this recruitment is at least preserved in many cases where the ability to move is not, several studies have employed observational interventions in attempts to enhance motor recovery (Rizzolatti, Fabbri-Destro, & Cattaneo, 2009 ). Ertelt et al. (2007) combined POA with physical training in stroke patients with upper limb deficits. A control group observed letters and geometric symbols rather than action sequences. The observed videos showed actions that had formerly been in the motor repertoire of the patients (e.g., grasping and manipulating everyday objects) and that needed to be relearned. On the functional side, only patients of the observation group improved in clinical tests, which is somewhat surprising as both groups underwent physical therapy. In addition, the analysis of functional images of all patients during exploratory manual Object-directed actions performed prior to and after the intervention revealed that only patients in the observation group showed enhanced activation in the SMA, ventral PMC bilaterally, the superior and inferior parietal lobe as well as the cerebellum.
Although the movements were not kinematically quantified within the scanner, the study suggests that the combination of observational training and physical practice has the power to reactivate motor representations guiding motor behavior. It should also be noted that brain activation during action execution differed in the cerebellum, a structure that has dominantly been viewed as related to motor control and coordination, but is now considered to also influence cognitive functions (Strick, Dum, & Fiez, 2009) . A TMS study by Celnik, Webster, Glasser, and Cohen (2008) supports Ertelt et al.'s finding (2007) regarding the positive effects of combining POA and physical practice in stroke patients. Further qualifying Ertelt et al.'s findings, they showed enhanced corticomotor excitability only when the observed movement matched the trained movements. This, however, is in line with the predictive simulation as well as with the direct-matching approach. These results suggest that when motor recovery is the primary aim, a tight congruence between observed, simulated, and executed movements might be maximally beneficial. In addition, one might speculate that implementing tasks in therapy which enhance predictive activity in action sequences should also help to reactivate motor areas. This might be a direction for future research and interventions.
With promising results already emerging from these basic scientific investigations, we suggest that there is a bright future for the study of POA and its role in both sports learning and rehabilitation settings. Future studies in this area might utilize stimuli that trigger the preparation and execution of complementary actions to enhance performance in social settings, or stimuli that induce motor immersion in a first-person perspective to more strongly stimulate the motor system. Learning and rehabilitation via interactive virtual reality settings (e.g., Eng et al., 2007) or mirror therapy (Altschuler et al., 1999; Sütbeyaz, Yazuzer, Sezer, & Koseoglu, 2007) may also hold promise for maximizing motor performance. From a conceptual viewpoint, these two latter approaches combine action execution and observational training concurrently, so that information processing in the nervous system is essentially different than during POA without execution (e.g., due to somatosensory feedback signals in action execution). In this overview, we have focused on learning and rehabilitation to gain a coherent picture about processes that are directly associated and can be triggered by observing other humans acting.
Reason, Observation, and Experience -the Holy Trinity of Science. Roberg G. Ingersoll
Conclusion
Action observation does not occur in a vacuum. Reviewing the current literature on the topic and linking the findings with the existing theoretical approaches reveal that both the functional correlates and behavioral consequences of POA are critically dependent on the context in which they are embedded. Our goals going into an observational engagement make a difference. The presence or absence of objects makes a difference. Our previous experiences in similar and dissimilar situations, and our current perspectives and goals further combine to make each instance of POA unique (see Fig. 1 for an overview on theoretical approaches to action understanding and their compatibility with empirical findings). We therefore support the idea that predictive approaches that focus on high-level representations, presumably generated outside the motor system, exist prior to most POA situations and therefore have a relevant impact on action representations. In looking into the brain's involvement, it is clear that POA elicits widespread activity in a complex network of cognitive, perceptual, and motor areas which are, to a large part, determined by this unique confluence of organismic, task and environmental demands. Understanding the constraints that these variables place on activation within the AON is essential to the implementation of visual demonstrations which will be used in future rehabilitation and training interventions.
